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The Constitutional Vulnerabilities of Kansas’s 
Income Tax Reforms* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On January 1, 2013, Senate Substitute for House Bill 2117 (HB 
2117) went into full effect and instituted an unprecedented approach to 
state income taxation.1  HB 2117 changed who is subject to income taxes 
in Kansas and entirely exempts many business owners while their 
employees continue to pay.2  While this bill altered Kansas income tax 
law in several “revolutionary” ways,3 this Comment specifically 
addresses several constitutional vulnerabilities created by these 
“revolutionary” features. 
Part II of this Comment first examines the practical effects of HB 
2117 and then provides a broad constitutional history of the federal and 
Kansas income taxes.  Part III argues against the constitutionality of HB 
2117 based on the text and history of the Kansas income tax amendment 
that gave the state legislature the authority to implement an income tax.  
This Part argues that the text and surrounding history of the amendment 
do not permit the regressive tax structure that HB 2117 will likely create.  
Part IV asserts that HB 2117 violates equal protection because it taxes 
similar taxpayers differently without sufficient justification.  Part V 
argues that HB 2117 unconstitutionally relies on arbitrary federal tax 
distinctions, and in doing so, impermissibly delegates Kansas legislative 
authority to a federal administrative agency. 
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 1.  Act of May 22, 2012, ch. 135, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws 1041. 
 2.  See KAN. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP’T, 2012 SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION 129 (2012). 
 3.  See generally Martin B. Dickinson, et al., The Revolutionary 2012 Kansas Tax Act, 61 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 295 (2012) (describing the practical tax implications of the legislation). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Tax Implications of HB 2117 
HB 2117 lowered Kansas income taxes in several ways.4  The bill 
replaced the previous three-bracket structure (with rates of 3.5%, 6.25%, 
and 6.45%) with a lower two-bracket structure (with rates of 3.0% and 
4.9%) and raised the standard deduction for single filers from $4,500 to 
$9,000 and the standard deduction for joint filers from $6,000 to $9,000.5  
To partially offset these revenue losses, HB 2117 eliminated the food 
sales tax rebate and several other credits and deductions including ones 
related to adoption expenses, alternative fuel equipment, child and 
dependent expenses, disabled access expenses, and environmental 
compliance.6  HB 2117 also raised revenue by prohibiting renters from 
claiming the homestead property tax refund and repealing the two-year 
severance tax exemption for certain sources of oil. 7 
While some of these features set Kansas apart from most states,8 the 
truly “revolutionary” feature of HB 2117 concerns how adjusted gross 
income (AGI) is calculated for Kansas purposes.9  Like many other 
states, Kansas starts with the federal definition of AGI and then modifies 
this definition as the legislature sees fit.10  HB 2117 removed several 
income sources from the calculation of Kansas AGI, which entirely 
exempts these sources of income from Kansas taxation.11  HB 2117 
excludes the following sources of income from the calculation of Kansas 
AGI beginning January 1, 2013: 
                                                          
 4.  See KAN. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP’T, supra note 2, at 12930. 
 5.  Id. at 129. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 130.  The pertinent statute was amended during the 2013 legislative session to specify 
“that the 50-barrel-per-day threshold [concerning] the new pool severance tax exemption for oil will 
be determined based on the initial six months of production from each well.”  See KAN. 
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP’T, TAXATION—SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION, VARIOUS PROVISIONS; 
HOUSE SUB. FOR SB 83 1 (2013). 
 8.  See, e.g., Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 339. (“Kansas will join Alabama and Mississippi 
as the only states that impose sales tax on purchases of food but do not provide relief for low-income 
persons.”). 
 9.  See Janet Novack, With Income Tax Changes, Kansas and Maryland Show Their True 
Colors, FORBES (June 12, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2012/06/12/with-income-
tax-changes-kansas-and-maryland-show-their-true-colors/ (noting that while North Carolina already 
exempted some income from pass-through entities, Kansas is the first state to do so without a cap). 
 10.  Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 296. 
 11.  See KAN. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP’T, supra note 2. 
2013] VULNERABILITIES OF KANSAS’S INCOME TAX 1023 
(1) Net profit from business as determined under the federal internal 
revenue code and reported from schedule C and on line 12 of the 
taxpayer’s form 1040 federal individual income tax return; (2) net 
income from rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, 
estates, trusts, residual interest in real estate mortgage investment 
conduits and net farm rental as determined under the federal internal 
revenue code and reported from schedule E and on line 17 of the 
taxpayer’s form 1040 federal individual income tax return; and (3) net 
farm profit as determined under the federal internal revenue code and 
reported from schedule F and on line 18 of the taxpayer’s form 1040 
federal income tax return; all to the extent included in the taxpayer’s 
federal adjusted gross income.12 
Under this provision, income derived from sole proprietorships, rental 
real estate, trusts, farms, mineral interests, copyrights, patent royalties, 
pass-through entities (including limited liability companies (LLCs), 
partnerships, and S corporations) is no longer subject to Kansas income 
taxation.13  However, capital gains, interest, and qualified dividends 
attributable to pass-through entities continue to be taxed under the new 
calculation of AGI.14 
Kansas Governor Sam Brownback, who championed and signed HB 
2117, contends it will provide economic benefits to the state and called it 
“a shot of adrenaline into the heart of the Kansas economy.”15  
According to Governor Brownback’s projections, HB 2117 will generate 
22,900 new jobs, provide $2 billion more in disposable income, and 
increase the state’s population by 35,740 residents, in addition to the 
normal growth rate of the state.16  Governor Brownback described the 
portion of HB 2117 that exempts several sources of income from Kansas 
AGI as “eliminat[ing] state income taxes on more than 191,000 small 
business owners.”17 
One consistent criticism of HB 2117 has been that it will do exactly 
what Governor Brownback claimed it will do—significantly reduce 
income tax revenue—leaving the state with a large deficit.18  The Kansas 
                                                          
 12.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,117(c)(xx) (Supp. 2012). 
 13.  Novack, supra note 9. 
 14.  See Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 30114. 
 15.  Press Release, Kan. Office of the Governor, Governor Brownback Signs Pro-Growth Tax 
Legislation (May 22, 2012), http://www.ksrevenue.org/pdf/ProGrowthPlan.pdf. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Brownback’s Derailed Tax Reform 
Becomes a Fiscal Train Wreck, 135 TAX NOTES 1193, 1193 (2012) (“[I]f official revenue estimates 
are correct, it will force local governments to choose between property tax increases or cuts to 
education, setting the stage for years of California-style budget crises.”). 
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Legislative Research Department originally estimated that the bill will 
reduce the state general fund’s annual receipts by $933.7 million by 
fiscal year 2018, resulting in a total loss of revenue of approximately 
$4.5 billion between fiscal years 2013 and 2018.19  One opponent of the 
bill described the fiscal effects as “deeper cuts to our public schools, 
more disabled Kansans left without critical services, and higher property 
taxes.”20 
Another criticism of HB 2117 is that it unfairly shifts the tax burden 
away from businesses, and not just the small businesses Governor 
Brownback pointed to when he signed the legislation.21  HB 2117 did not 
include a limit on the amount of business income that can be exempted.22  
This allows large businesses that are owned by a small number of people 
to be structured as partnerships, LLCs, or S corporations and escape state 
income taxation.23  The lack of a cap distinguishes HB 2117 from a 
similar North Carolina law passed in 2011 that capped the exemption at 
$50,000.24  Critics are also concerned about the distribution of the overall 
income tax burden after HB 2117 goes into effect.  Many high-earning 
professionals (including doctors, lawyers, accountants, and architects) 
own their own pass-through entity practices and are therefore exempt 
from income taxation under HB 2117, while their lower-paid employees 
will continue to pay.25 
B. Constitutional History of the Federal Income Tax 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “lay 
and collect Taxes.”26  This power is limited by another provision that 
reads, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken.”27  In 1895, the Supreme Court decided Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan 
                                                          
 19.  KAN. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP’T, supra note 2, at 130. 
 20.  Brent D. Wistrom, Governor Signs Bill for Massive Tax Cuts, WICHITA EAGLE, May 23, 
2012, http://www.kansas.com/2012/05/22/2344393/governor-signs-bill-for-massive.html (quoting 
Democratic House Minority Leader Paul Davis). 
 21.  John Hanna, Brownback Chose Not to Push for More Tax Cuts, TOPEKA CAP.-J., August 
18, 2012, http://cjonline.com/news/2012-08-18/brownback-chose-not-push-more-tax-cuts. 
 22.  Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 340. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Novack, supra note 9. 
 25.  Martin Dickinson, Kansas Tax Act Most Regressive in Nation, LAWRENCE J. WORLD, May 
27, 2012, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2012/may/27/kansas-tax-act-most-regressive-nation/. 
 26.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 27.  Id. § 9, cl. 4. 
2013] VULNERABILITIES OF KANSAS’S INCOME TAX 1025 
& Trust Co., which struck down a precursor to the modern federal 
income tax by finding that it was a “direct tax” that had to be apportioned 
among the states according to representation.28  In response, Congress 
ratified the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 which reads, “Congress shall 
have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without 
regard to any census or enumeration.”29  Later, in Brushaber v. Union 
Pacific Rail Road, the Supreme Court confirmed that Congress could 
implement a progressive income tax under the Sixteenth Amendment. 30  
Brushaber ended any serious doubt regarding the constitutionality of a 
progressive federal income tax.31 
C. History of the Kansas Income Tax 
Kansas first allowed a state income tax after the voters approved a 
constitutional amendment in 1932.32  This amendment is currently 
codified as article 11, section 2 of the Kansas Constitution and reads, 
“The state shall have power to levy and collect taxes on incomes from 
whatever source derived, which taxes may be graduated and 
progressive.”33 
The origins of the Kansas income tax can be traced back to the 
populist movement of the late 1880s and 1890s.34  At that time, state and 
local property taxes targeted farmers and farmland extensively, while 
those owning stocks, bonds, and railroads often escaped taxation.35  The 
Populist Party harnessed widespread concern over tax inequality and 
supported the implementation of a graduated income tax. 36  The party’s 
efforts originally focused on a graduated income tax at the national 
                                                          
 28.  158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVI. 
 29.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 30.  240 U.S. 1, 24−25 (1916) (upholding the progressive income tax from a challenge on due 
process grounds). 
 31.  See Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 131−32 (1999) (“The cases after Brushaber show that the 
Court has clearly proceeded under the assumption that progressive taxation is constitutionally 
permissible.”). 
 32.  H. EDWARD FLENTJE & JOSEPH A. AISTRUP, KANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 178 
(2010). 
 33.  KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 34.   FLENTJE & AISTRUP, supra note 32, at 176 (explaining that during this period “farmers 
expressed a growing discontent with the inequities of taxes, both state and national”). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 177. 
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level.37  Even though progressive legislators voted to ratify the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1911, no serious efforts were made towards 
implementing a state income tax until 1914 when Kansas voters rejected 
the first income tax amendment.38  In 1919, Republican Governor Henry 
Allen became the first governor to suggest a progressive income tax as a 
solution to the “inequality in the distribution of the tax burden.”39  
Governor Allen convinced the legislature to submit an income tax 
amendment for approval by the voters, who again rejected it in the 
election of 1920.40 
The movement that led to the ultimately successful income tax 
amendment began in the mid-1920s and was pushed primarily by 
organized agricultural groups.41  The Kansas Farm Bureau, which desired 
a reduction of property taxes on farmers, endorsed a state income tax 
beginning in 1924.42  Another Governor, Clyde Reed, pledged in his 
1928 gubernatorial campaign to “moderniz[e] . . . the state system in 
order to reduce the land-tax load.”43  Again, an income tax amendment 
was submitted to the voters in the election of 1930, and again, Kansas 
voters rejected the amendment.44 
Farm interests, aided by the Kansas Chamber of Commerce, called 
for resubmission of the income tax amendment during the 1931 
legislative session. 45  The farm lobby found support from the newly 
elected Governor, Harry Woodring, who called for resubmission of an 
income tax amendment in order “to lift the part of the load now borne by 
real and tangible personal property, and so far as possible to distribute it 
to other forms of wealth which hitherto either in whole or in part have 
escaped the tax burden.”46  Governor Woodring successfully persuaded 
the legislature to once again submit an income tax amendment to the 
voters (for the fourth time in less than twenty years) during the 1931 
                                                          
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.  This 1914 amendment would have eliminated the “uniform and equal” requirement, 
which would have allowed property to be taxed at different rates and permitted a graduated income 
tax.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id.  This 1920 amendment would have given the legislature “complete freedom from 
constitutional constraints” on taxation which consequently would have permitted a progressive 
income tax.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 177−78. 
 46.  Id. at 178 (quoting KEITH D. MCFARLAND, HARRY H. WOODRING : A POLITICAL 
BIOGRAPHY OF FDR’S CONTROVERSIAL SECRETARY OF WAR 41 (1975)). 
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legislative session.47  Woodring’s opponent in the gubernatorial election 
of 1932, Alf Landon, also supported the income tax amendment48 and 
campaigned on a platform that called for taxes on forms of wealth 
derived from income and investments.49 
In the election of 1932, Kansas elected Alf Landon governor and 
voted to amend the state constitution to allow for the implementation of 
an income tax by a 58% to 42% margin.50  Governor Landon took the 
success of the amendment as a mandate and helped enact the first state 
income tax on the last day of the 1933 legislative session.51  This first 
Kansas income tax had a graduated structure between 1% and 4% for 
individuals and taxed corporate income at 2%.52  The legislature kept the 
income tax rates at these initial levels until 1957, when it raised them for 
the first time. 53  As a result of this new revenue source, property taxes 
fell from 72% of state revenue during the 1920s to 54% of state revenue 
between 1930 and 1937.54 
III. ARTICLE 11, SECTION 2 OF THE KANSAS CONSTITUTION. 
The Kansas Legislature’s current authority to levy an income tax is 
derived from the income tax amendment of 1932, which is currently 
codified as article 11, section 2 of the state constitution.55  As explained 
                                                          
 47.  Id. 
 48.  DONALD R. MCCOY, LANDON OF KANSAS 106 (1966). 
 49.  Id. at 95.  The election of 1932 also included the “colorful” third-party candidacy of Dr. 
John R. Brinkley.  Id. at 92.  Dr. Brinkley acquired a national following and a considerable fortune 
by surgically transplanting goat-glands into people supposedly to provide the recipient virility.  Id.  
He became a national celebrity and prominent radio host in the region and ran a relatively successful 
gubernatorial campaign in 1930 in which he received 183,278 votes compared to Woodring’s 
217,171 votes and the Republican candidate’s 216,920 votes.  Id.  Dr. Brinkley also ran for governor 
in 1932 and was the only candidate who did not support the income tax amendment.  See id. at 
91−92, 112. 
 50.  See FLENTJE & AISTRUP, supra note 32, at 178. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 179. 
 54.  Peter Fearon, Taxation, Spending, and Budgets: Public Finance in Kansas During the 
Great Depression, 28 KAN. HIST. 235 (200506). 
 55.  As a general rule, the state is presumed to possess the power to enforce any legislation it 
sees fit.  See In re ANR Pipeline Co., 79 P.3d 751, 766 (Kan. 2003) (“It is fundamental that the 
Kansas Constitution limits rather than confers powers.”).  However, in the particular case of the 
income tax (as explained below), the legislature apparently did not possess the authority to 
implement an income tax before the income tax amendment.  Consequently, the 1932 income tax 
amendment can be seen as granting an exception to the underlying presumption against income 
taxes.  This means that the amendment, in a sense, authorized the imposition of an income tax and 
rendered any income tax that falls outside of article 11, section 2 unconstitutional. 
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below, the text of this amendment suggests that the legislature is 
permitted to implement a flat or “graduated and progressive” income tax, 
but cannot implement a regressive income tax.  According to an 
originalist interpretation, the history of the income tax amendment also 
suggests that regressive income taxes are impermissible.  HB 2117 
enacts a regressive income tax system as a whole, and consequently, it 
may be seen as unconstitutional according to article 11, section 2 of the 
Kansas constitution.  Additionally, because HB 2117 exempts several 
types of business and financial income, it is contrary to the intent of 
those who enacted the provision. 
The Kansas Supreme Court has previously relied on the text and 
original intent of constitutional provisions in determining the validity of 
statutes.56  One statement of this approach reads: 
In ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, the primary 
duty of the courts is to look to the intention of the makers and adopters 
of that provision.  In interpreting and construing the constitutional 
amendment, the court must examine the language used and consider it 
in connection with the general surrounding facts and circumstances that 
cause the amendment to be submitted.  A constitutional provision is not 
to be narrowly or technically construed, but its language should be 
interpreted to mean what the words imply to persons of common 
understanding. . . .  When interpreting the constitution, each word must 
be given due force and appropriate meaning.57 
According to this standard of constitutional construction, HB 2117 is 
unconstitutional if it violates the overall intent of the “makers and 
adopters” of article 11, section 2. 
A. HB 2117 Violates the Text of Article 11, Section 2 of the Kansas 
Constitution. 
According to the Kansas Supreme Court, one appropriate starting 
point for constitutional construction is to “examine the language used.”58  
Article 11, section 2 of the Kansas Constitution reads, “The state shall 
have power to levy and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source 
                                                          
 56.  See, e.g., In re Cent. Ill. Pub. Servs. Co., 78 P.3d 419, 426 (Kan. 2003); Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. McGraw Fertilizer Serv., Inc., 933 P.2d 698, 702−03 (Kan. 1997); State ex rel. Stephan 
v. Finney, 867 P.2d 1034, 1049 (Kan. 1994); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 802 
P.2d 584, 588−89 (Kan. 1990), superseded by constitutional amendment, KAN. CONST. art. 11 § 1, as 
recognized in In re Cent. Ill. Pub. Servs. Co., 78 P.3d 419 (Kan. 2003)). 
 57.  Stephan, 867 P.2d at 1049 (citations omitted). 
 58.  See id. 
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derived, which taxes may be graduated and progressive.”59  According to 
this language, as explained below, the state cannot levy an income tax 
that is the opposite of “graduated and progressive.”  This means the state 
cannot implement a regressive income tax. 
This concept of progressive60 versus regressive61 tax systems 
involves the concept of vertical equity (or equality) in taxation.  Vertical 
equity is a description of the relative wellbeing of taxpayers at different 
income levels under a particular tax scheme.62  The debate regarding 
vertical equity centers on whether it is appropriate for those with higher 
incomes to pay higher tax rates than do their lower-income 
counterparts.63 
According to a textual reading of article 11, section 2, the state 
cannot enact a regressive income tax system.  Without any surrounding 
historical context, the text of this provision—“The state shall have power 
to levy and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived, 
which taxes may be graduated and progressive”—suggests three 
conclusions.  First, the state has the power to collect income taxes.  The 
language of the “levy and collect” clause is taken from the federal 
income tax amendment, which was adopted years before the Kansas 
income tax amendment.64  Second, the state is explicitly permitted to 
collect “graduated and progressive” income taxes.65 
Third, the combination of these two phrases suggests that the state 
cannot enact a regressive income tax structure.  The first phrase—“[t]he 
state shall have power to levy and collect taxes on incomes from 
whatever source derived”—introduces a baseline rule that Kansas is 
permitted to implement an income tax.  The second phrase—“which 
taxes may be graduated and progressive”—permits a deviation to the 
                                                          
 59.  KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 60.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a progressive tax is “[a] tax structured so that the 
effective tax rate increases more than proportionately as the tax base increases, or so that an 
exemption remains flat or diminishes.  With this type of tax, the percentage of income paid in taxes 
increases as the taxpayer’s income increases.”  1596 (9th ed. 2009). 
 61.  A regressive tax is “[a] tax structured so that the effective tax rate decreases as the tax base 
increases.  With this type of tax, the percentage of income paid in taxes decreases as the taxpayer’s 
income increases.”  Id. at 1597. 
 62.  Jim Chen, Progressive Taxation: An Aesthetic and Moral Defense, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 659, 676 (2012). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes . . . .”) 
 65.  The term “graduated” is closely associated with the term “progressive” in the context of 
taxation.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, it refers to “[a] tax employing a rate schedule with 
higher marginal rates for larger taxable bases.”  1595 (9th ed. 2009). 
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general rule in the direction of progressivity.  The combination of these 
two phrases suggests at minimum that the exact opposite type of 
deviation (regressivity) is not permitted.  If this is not the case, the 
“graduated and progressive” clause would be redundant because the 
original clause would have already permitted a progressive income tax. 
This conclusion is based on the negative implication embodied in the 
canon of construction known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius or 
“expression of the one is exclusion of the other.”66  According to Justice 
Scalia, a clear application of this canon occurs when a sign instructs that 
“children under twelve may enter free.”67  According to this canon, 
everyone who reads this sign knows that thirteen-year-olds may not enter 
for free.68 
Additionally, article 11, section 2 suggests that regressive taxes are 
not permitted even more strongly than Justice Scalia’s example.  In 
Justice Scalia’s example, the sign discriminates based on age.  Age is a 
category that includes an unlimited number of possibilities.  Justice 
Scalia’s sign does not answer whether a senior citizen can enter for free.  
Conversely, there are only two options within the category of possible 
deviations from tax equality: a progressive deviation or a regressive 
deviation.  The inclusion of “graduated and progressive” necessarily 
includes the contemplation of the opposite.  Both “progressive” and 
“regressive” speak to the same trait of vertical tax distribution.  An 
example closer to the situation presented by article 11, section 2 would 
be a sign reading, “No entry after dark.”  Because this sign specifically 
speaks to darkness, the only possible conclusion is that entry while it is 
light out is permitted according to the text of the sign. 
According to a similar canon of construction, when a provision 
“enumerates a list of exceptions to a power . . . found in the same 
[provision], the convention is to treat the list as presumptively 
exclusive.”69  Here, article 11, section 2 provides the power to implement 
an income tax.  It then enumerates a specific exception to the general 
assumption that all taxes are to fall equally by explicitly allowing 
“graduated and progressive” income taxes.  This reading of  article 11, 
section 2 suggests that regressive income taxes are not permitted under 
the Kansas constitution. 
                                                          
 66.  See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (1997). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional 
Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1738 (2004) (citing United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 
(1997)). 
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While the Kansas Supreme Court has previously used the concept of 
negative implication in the context of statutory construction,70 many find 
the canons of construction unpersuasive or worse.71 
B. HB 2117 Violates the Original Intent of Article 11, Section 2 of the 
Kansas Constitution. 
According to the originalist approach articulated above in State ex 
rel. Stephan, the primary goal of the court is to identify the “intention of 
the makers and adopters” of a provision.72  While the court uses the text 
of the provision, it also looks to the “general surrounding facts and 
circumstances that cause[d] the amendment to be submitted.”73  If a 
Kansas court were to apply this standard to article 11, section 2, it would 
likely conclude that the historical surroundings of this provision also 
suggest a prohibition on regressive income taxation. 
There is substantial historical evidence to suggest that there was an 
assumption of equal income taxation in Kansas because of the “uniform 
and equal” clause74 of the Kansas Constitution.  According to this 
understanding, even a flat income tax violated the “uniform and equal” 
clause.  When the voters ratified the Kansas income tax amendment, they 
implicitly rejected regressive income taxation. 
An appropriate starting point for determining what the “makers and 
adopters” of article 11, section 2 intended is to look to the public 
pronouncements of Governor Woodring who persuaded the Kansas 
legislature to refer the successful income tax amendment to the voters. 75  
The Governor outlined his reasons for supporting the amendment during 
his address to the legislature in 1931: 
Students of American tax problems have long been familiar with the 
fact that our systems have not kept pace with economic developments 
in our nation.  Seventy years ago when our tax system in Kansas was 
devised practically all property consisted either of real estate or other 
visible property and tangible property. . . . 
                                                          
 70.  E.g., State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 22 P.3d 124, 146 (Kan. 2001) (“K.S.A. 60–521, by 
negative implication, retains governmental immunity from the statute of limitations for causes of 
action arising out of a governmental function.”). 
 71.  See SCALIA, supra note 66, at 25–26 (“[I]n fact, the canons have been attacked as a 
sham . . . .”). 
 72.  867 P.2d 1034, 1049 (Kan. 1994). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  The modern version of this clause is codified at KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 75.  FLENTJE & AISTRUP, supra note 32, at 176–78. 
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To-day the situation is entirely changed.  Economic evolution has 
brought about a vast increase of intangible property—stocks, bonds, 
moneys, notes—most of which escapes the assessor; especially since 
we attempt to levy on this class of property the ad volorem or full rate 
of the general property tax.  Real and tangible property is no longer the 
sole index of wealth in our state. . . . 
. . . . 
In the absence of authority to enact a graduated income tax law, I 
considered recommending to the legislature the passage of a flat 
income tax law with deductions of twenty-five dollars to relieve small 
incomes, and with further provision for the deduction of amounts paid 
in general property taxes.  I have, however, been informed that such a 
law would be a violation of the “uniform and equal” clause of our 
constitution and therefore abandoned the income tax as a source of 
revenue until the constitution shall have been amended.76 
Two propositions emerge from this source.  It appears the overall 
purpose of the income tax amendment was to update the state’s system of 
collecting revenue to keep pace with the economic shift from land to 
financial assets as the primary source of wealth.  Additionally, it is clear 
that Governor Woodring did not believe he had the ability to levy either 
a flat income tax or a progressive income tax because of the “uniform 
and equal” clause of the constitution. 
Other sources are consistent with these two takeaways regarding the 
“intention[s] of the makers and adopters” of article 11, section 2.  One 
Kansas newspaper, the Lawrence Journal-World, explained this 
amendment to the voters (or the adopters) at the time: 
Amendment No. 1 The Income Tax Amendment 
Proposes to give the legislature authority to pass a graduated income 
tax, thereby shifting a part of the burden of taxes from real estate 
owners to those who are more able to bear it. 
a.  This would tax salaries, incomes from investments, interest, etc., and 
make it possible to reduce taxes on farms and homes. 
b.  It would levy tax according to the ability of the individual to pay. 
                                                          
 76.  Governor Harry Woodring, Message of Governor Harry H. Woodring to the Legislature of 
1931, 6−8 (Jan. 14, 1931). 
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c.  It is considered sound by authorities of tax problems, and is in use in 
other states.77 
Another newspaper described the amendment as authorizing “the state to 
levy graduated and progressive income taxes from whatever source 
derived.”78  Yet another newspaper described the amendment as the 
“Graduated Income Tax Amendment.”79 
An advertisement in support of Governor Woodring highlighted his 
support for the amendment and described its benefits as increasing “the 
state’s revenue from larger incomes, thereby relieving the tax burden on 
the farmer and home owner.” 80  Another public advocate complained 
about the distribution of the state’s tax system prior to the amendment.  
He contended that farmers paid an average of 44% of their income, 
retired citizens paid 27.5%, businesspeople paid 10%, professionals paid 
10%, bank officers paid 3.5%, and teachers paid 2.9% of their income in 
state taxes.81  He also complained that those currently exempt from 
taxation were not the “needy ones” but “the ones best able to pay.”82  
Additionally, fifteen years after the election that ratified the income tax 
amendment, the Kansas Supreme Court commented, “We need not dwell 
on the fact that the purpose of the income tax law was to provide for a 
graduated and progressive tax on income . . . .”83 
All of this evidence supports the proposition that Kansas income 
taxes are permitted to be either flat or “graduated and progressive,” but 
not regressive.  Those who supported the successful income tax 
amendment in 1932 (the “makers and adopters” of the provision) favored 
the amendment because it allowed the legislature to implement a 
particular type of tax structure.  That new income taxes could be and 
would be progressive, and thus redistribute the tax burden, was the focal 
                                                          
 77.  The Facts About the Tax Amendments to Be Submitted to the Voters of Kansas on Nov. 8, 
LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Oct. 19, 1932, at 2.  The income tax amendment was submitted with another 
amendment that would have placed constitutional limits on property taxes.  See id. 
 78.  Income Tax Is Approved, WEEKLY KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 9th, 1932, at 2. 
 79.  Kansas Voters Adopt Income Tax, 3 to Two, TOPEKA DAILY CAP., Nov. 11, 1932, at 1. 
 80.  Vote for Woodring and the Income Tax Amendment, WEEKLY KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 2, 
1932, at 9.  The advertisement primarily targets the third-party candidate Dr. Brinkley (who did not 
support the income tax) instead of the eventual winner, Republican Alf Landon.  Id. 
 81.  W.H. Finney Attacks Present Tax System, TOPEKA DAILY CAP., Nov. 1, 1932, at 7. 
 82.  Id. (“If the unemployed, the unfortunate, the needy and those in distress were the ones who 
are not now called on to pay their share of the cost of government, we would agree that at this time 
nothing should be done about it.  But such is not the case.  A study of the assessors’ returns indicate 
that those now exempt are not the needy ones.  In fact, they are the ones best able to pay, and far 
more able than the real estate owner who now foots the bill of government expenses.”) 
 83.  Hartman v. State Comm’n of Revenue and Taxation, 187 P.2d 939, 944−45 (Kan. 1947). 
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point of the amendment.  These sources clearly indicate that a regressive 
income tax would likely not be permissible under the amendment 
according to the intent of its “makers and adopters.” The first Kansas 
state income tax was “graduated and progressive,” as has been every 
income tax since.84  It is unlikely that the very opposite type of income 
tax, which would accomplish the opposite of what the amendment’s 
supporters intended, would be permitted under this amendment. 
One possible counterargument to this analysis turns on the Uniform 
and Equal Clause of the Kansas Constitution85 and whether it currently 
applies to Kansas income taxes.  This argument would contend that 
because the Uniform and Equal Clause did not limit income taxes at the 
time of the amendment or does not limit them now, there are no 
constitutional constraints on the legislature’s ability to implement a 
regressive income tax because the state is presumed to have all power not 
restricted by the constitution.86  This would mean that while article 11, 
section 2 specifically allows for a “graduated and progressive” income 
tax, it does not necessarily preclude the imposition of a regressive 
income tax.  There is some support for this argument.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court in a 1947 case stated that the Uniform and Equal Clause 
did not apply to the income tax.87  Additionally, some secondary sources 
have also concluded that the Uniform and Equal Clause does not apply to 
income taxes in Kansas.88  However, this counterargument fails for two 
reasons. 
First, the historical evidence strongly suggests that the Uniform and 
Equal Clause was thought to apply at the time of the 1932 amendment.  
Governor Woodring explicitly said he was prevented from implementing 
even a flat income tax because of the Uniform and Equal Clause.89  Also, 
that the Kansas Legislature submitted the income tax amendment four 
separate times, in the elections of 1914, 1920, 1930, 1932,90 strongly 
                                                          
 84.  See FLENTJE & AISTRUP, supra note 32, at 179. 
 85.  KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 86.  Cf. In re ANR Pipeline Co., 79 P.3d 751, 766 (Kan. 2003) (presenting a similar argument 
in the context of the taxation of public utility intangibles). 
 87.  Hartman, 187 P.2d at 944 (“We pause here to note the taxpayer’s contention that previous 
decisions of this court, including the last case, leading to a conclusion that an income tax is an excise 
tax and not subject to provisions of Art. 11, § 1, appear to be impeached by our decision . . . .  We 
think not.” (citing Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. v. State Comm’n of Revenue and Taxation, 125 P.2d 
397 (Kan. 1942)). 
 88.  See, e.g., 1 WADE NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE 
TAXATION 508 (2d ed. 1984) (concluding that an income tax is an excise tax that did not fall under 
the restrictions of the Uniform and Equal Clause). 
 89.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 90.  See supra notes 38−51 and accompanying text. 
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suggests it did not possess the authority to pass an income tax without 
constitutional amendment.  Both of these sources indicate the Uniform 
and Equal Clause was thought to apply at the time of the amendment. 
Second, even if the Uniform and Equal Clause did not apply to 
income taxes at the time of the amendment, or does not apply to income 
taxes now, the history surrounding article 11, section 2 seems to presume 
equality in taxation.  If this is the case, then article 11, section 2 can be 
seen as implicitly prohibiting the implementation of a regressive income 
tax.  When the voters decided to specifically allow for a graduated 
income tax, they implicitly restricted the opposite type of tax.  According 
to both the text of article 11, section 2 and the intentions of the “makers 
and adopters” of the amendment, the Kansas legislature is prohibited 
from implementing a regressive income tax. 
C. HB 2117 Creates a Regressive Income Tax Overall and Is Therefore 
Unconstitutional 
On its face, HB 2117 purports to maintain a progressive tax 
structure.91  In actuality, it will likely create a regressive income tax 
system as a whole.92  The truly regressive feature of HB 2117 is the 
unlimited exemption of several types and sources of income.93  It allows 
for an unlimited amount of certain sources of income to be entirely 
excluded from Kansas income taxation. 94  Very wealthy Kansans who 
receive their entire incomes from certain sources will pay a Kansas 
income tax rate of 0%.  Other commenters have concluded that the effect 
of this exemption will almost certainly be to “transform the Kansas 
income tax into a regressive system, with lower-income Kansans 
cumulatively paying a higher percentage of their income in tax than will 
higher-income Kansans.”95 
While Kansas will certainly have a less progressive income tax after 
HB 2117,96 the constitutional question is whether the Kansas income tax 
                                                          
 91.  See KAN. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP’T, supra note 2. 
 92.  Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 340. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  HB 2117 reduced the top tax rate from 6.45% to 4.9% (a 24% decrease), reduced the 
6.25% rate to 4.9% (a 22% decrease), and reduced the lowest rate from 3.5% to 3.0% (a 14% 
decrease).  Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1194.  One study by the Institute on Taxation and Economic 
Policy (which took into account not only rate reductions but also the eliminations of deductions and 
credits) estimated that the poorest 20% of Kansans, with an average annual income of $11,000, will 
see their taxes increase under HB 2117 by 1.3% per year.  INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, 
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is regressive as a whole after the bill.  However, it is difficult to identify 
at precisely what point an income tax becomes regressive.  Is an income 
tax regressive when the top one percent of earners pay a lower 
percentage of their income than the bottom ninety-nine percent?  Is an 
income tax regressive when just a few very-high earners pay a lower 
effective rate than others?  Does every taxpayer who earns more than any 
other taxpayer have to pay a higher percentage of her income for a 
system to be progressive?  Without establishing a precise proportional 
definition, it is reasonable to conclude that HB 2117 implements a 
regressive state income tax system as a whole. 
Many very wealthy people will no longer pay Kansas income taxes 
after HB 2117.  While the proponents of HB 2117 claimed it would 
exempt small business owners,97 it is certain to also exempt owners of 
some large businesses as well.  Nationwide in 2009, 188,656 tax-
designated S corporations netted over $1 million in income along with 
199,566 partnerships and 25,550 nonfarm sole proprietorships.98  The 
owners of these businesses who live in Kansas will no longer pay state 
income tax on these sources of income.  The Institute on Taxation and 
Economic Policy has studied the likely effects of HB 2117 and 
concluded it will distribute Kansas income taxes according to the 












































































                                                                                                                       
 
TAX BILL SIGNED BY GOVERNOR BROWNBACK MAKES KANSAS AN OUTLIER (2012), 
http://www.itep.org/pdf/KSFamilies.pdf.  According to this study, “[t]he middle 20 percent of 
Kansas taxpayers will pay 0.5 percent less of their income in taxes” and the wealthiest one percent’s 
taxes will drop by 2% per year (for an average savings of $21,087).  Id. 
 97.  Press Release, supra note 15. 
 98.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CHOICE OF BUSINESS 
ENTITY 17 (2012), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4402. 
 99.  INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS?  A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 58 (4th ed. 2013), http://www.itep.org/pdf/whopaysreport.pdf. 
































































While these are preliminary estimates of how HB 2117 will redistribute 
the Kansas income tax, this table suggests that HB 2117 will create a 
regressive income tax system as a whole.  While these findings may not 
seem particularly regressive at first glance, this would be a relatively 
regressive income tax system compared to other states100 and the federal 
income tax.101  The Kansas income is likely to be regressive even 
compared to states with constitutional mandates of flat income taxation, 
such as Illinois.102 
A natural counterargument to this proposed restriction on 
regressivity is that income taxes are inherently complex and policy-
driven and therefore should be left to the legislature.  While tax policy is 
certainly the legislature’s duty, the Kansas Supreme Court recently 
involved itself in similar policy-driven matter when it required levels of 
education funding because of another provision in the Kansas 
Constitution.103  A prohibition against income tax regressivity as a whole 
would require far less judicial policymaking than happened in the 
education-funding context.  A court could simply strike down laws that 
create regressive income tax schemes instead of having to continuously 
monitor whether the state legislature was meeting an affirmative duty. 
                                                          
 100.  Id. 
 101.  See generally DAVID S. LOGAN, SUMMARY OF LATEST FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
DATA 3 (2011), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff285.pdf. 
 102.  INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY , supra note 99, at 52; see also ILL. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 3 (“A tax on or measured by income shall be at a non-graduated rate.  At any one time there may 
be no more than one such tax imposed by the State for State purposes on individuals and one such 
tax so imposed on corporations.”). 
 103.  See Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K−12 Corral: Legislative v. Judicial Power in the 
Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (2006) (explaining that the 
school-finance litigation was a confrontation between the courts and the Kansas legislature). 
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D. HB 2117 Unconstitutionally Frustrates the Intent of the Income Tax 
Amendment 
In a broader sense, HB 2117 frustrates the original intent of the 
Kansas income tax amendment because it exempts several types of 
business and financial income under the authority of an amendment that 
was at least partially meant to tax these types of assets.104  Vertical equity 
was also a concern at the time of the amendment’s passage.  As the 
historical sources noted above indicate, the purpose of the income tax 
amendment was to give the state the authority to tax employees, business 
people, and financial assets because land was no longer the primary 
measurement of wealth in the twentieth-century economy.105  While 
employees are still subject to Kansas income taxes after HB 2117, many 
types of business owners are now exempt.  This seems to warp the 
intentions of the “makers and adopters” of the article 11, section 2.  If 
original intent means anything, it should stand for the proposition that the 
state cannot rely on constitutional authority to accomplish the exact 
opposite of what the drafters of a provision intended.  Article 11, section 
2 was at least partially designed to tax the newly dominant forms of 
wealth, business, and financial assets.  HB 2117 exempts many of these 
types of assets and, in doing so, frustrates the original intent behind 
article 11, section 2 of the Kansas Constitution. 
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION 
Even if a court were to find these historical and textual arguments 
regarding article 11, section 2 unpersuasive, HB 2117 may violate equal 
protection according to any of three lines of precedent.  First, a state or 
federal court could conclude that HB 2117 furthers an improper purpose 
because it explicitly favors one (relatively politically powerful) class of 
income earners over another.  Second, a court could decide that HB 2117 
violates equal protection because it results in highly unequal tax 
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.  Third, a court could find that 
HB 2117 creates arbitrary tax distinctions that are unrelated to the 
furtherance of a legitimate state policy objective. 
                                                          
 104.  See supra notes 76−84 and accompanying text. 
 105.  See, e.g., Woodring, supra note 76 (“To-day the situation is entirely changed.  Economic 
evolution has brought about a vast increase of intangible property—stocks, bonds, moneys, notes—
most of which escapes the assessor . . .  Real and tangible property is no longer the sole index of 
wealth in our state.”). 
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While Part III of this Comment argues that HB 2117 violates article 
11, section 2 because it violates a presumption of vertical equity, this 
Part argues that HB 2117 runs contrary to notions of horizontal equity; 
the idea that similarly situated taxpayers should bear roughly equal tax 
burdens.106  HB 2117 violates the principle of horizontal equity in several 
instances.  For example, a cardiologist who owns a partnership in her 
practice pays no state income tax (under HB 2117) while a cardiologist 
who works as a hospital employee will pay state income tax on her entire 
income.107  Similarly, a law partner working as a criminal defense 
counsel pays no state income taxes under HB 2117 while her opponent in 
court, a state prosecutor, will pay state income taxes as an employee.108  
There are also horizontal equity concerns with HB 2117 because it taxes 
some passive types of investments (stocks and bonds), but entirely 
exempts other types of passive investment (real estate rent, mineral 
royalties, passive farm income) from state income taxation.109  These 
distinctions are contrary to federal precedent110 and treat similarly 
situated taxpayers grossly differently under the law. 
A. Tax Distinctions Under Equal Protection 
Different treatment of essentially similar taxpayers implicates review 
under the equal protection guarantee of the U.S. and Kansas 
Constitutions.  Equal protection review, (under the Kansas Constitution 
Bill of Rights section 1) is implicated when “a statute treats arguably 
indistinguishable classes of people differently.”111  Put another way, an 
equal protection challenge must be based on an instance where “persons 
classified by the enactment are similarly situated to those who were 
excluded from the classification.”112  The Kansas Supreme Court has 
previously granted equal protection review to a petitioner challenging the 
validity of the deferential income tax treatment between single and 
married taxpayers.113  This is an appropriate analogy to the situation 
presented by HB 2117 because single and married are different statuses 
                                                          
 106.  Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 335. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 336. 
 110.  Id. at 335–36. 
 111.  In re Weisgerber, 169 P.3d 321, 326 (Kan. 2007) (citing  Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 
992 (Kan. 1993)). 
 112.  Id. at 328. 
 113.  Peden v. State, 930 P.2d 1, 10−11 (Kan. 1996). 
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in a legal sense, as are employees and sole-proprietors, but may be 
essentially similar in other regards.114 
Another consideration is that any potential challenger to HB 2117 
would be harmed by the law only relative to the tax treatment of others.  
The Kansas Supreme Court has specifically addressed this issue and 
determined that relatively unfair taxation can constitute a violation of 
equal protection.115  The court concluded, “If similarly situated taxpayers 
receive disparate treatment, the one receiving the less favorable treatment 
may have been denied equal protection of the law even if the taxpayer 
receiving the less favorable tax is taxed according to the law.”116  
According to this precedent, HB 2117 is subject to equal protection 
review even though it actually benefits, rather than harms, certain 
groups. 
Under equal protection, rational basis review is the appropriate 
standard when a law does not target a “suspect class or burden a 
fundamental right.”117  The Kansas Supreme Court explained this rational 
basis standard: 
The [rational basis] test is violated only if the statutory classification 
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s 
legitimate objective.  The state legislature is presumed to have acted 
within its constitutional power, even if the statute results in some 
inequality.  Under the [rational basis] test, a statutory discrimination 
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it.118 
This standard creates two requirements for HB 2117 to be upheld.  The 
bill must further a “legitimate objective” and the means chosen to pursue 
that objective must not be “wholly irrelevant” to its achievement.  
Furthermore, because HB 2117 involves tax classifications, courts are 
even more deferential.119 
When Governor Brownback signed HB 2117, he provided five 
legitimate objectives that the law furthers.120  Governor Brownback and 
other supporters contend HB 2117 will: (1) improve the Kansas 
                                                          
 114.  Id. at 10. 
 115.  In re City of Wichita, 59 P.3d 336, 341−42 (Kan. 2002) (citing Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. 
Beshears, 24 P.3d 113, 113 (Kan. 2001)). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Downtown Bar & Grill, LLC v. State, 273 P.3d 709, 714−15 (Kan. 2012) (quoting State v. 
Stallings, 163 P.3d 1232, 1239 (Kan. 2007)). 
 118.  Peden, 930 P.2d at 10−11 (quoting Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 849 (Kan. 1989)). 
 119.  See id. at 11 (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)). 
 120.  Press Release, supra note 15. 
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economy; (2) provide jobs; (3) increase taxpayers’ disposable income; 
(4) increase the Kansas population; and (5) help small businesses.121  
Any challenger under the rational basis equal protection standard would 
not only have to negate these objectives, but would also have to negate 
any other conceivable justification for the distinctions within the law.122  
There are three lines of precedent a court could rely on to conclude that 
HB 2117 violates equal protection. 
B. HB 2117 Advances an “Improper Purpose” 
First, a state or federal court could decide that HB 2117 advances an 
“improper purpose” of advantaging one group over another without a 
greater benefit to society.  This is related to the general constitutional 
prohibition against “naked preference” in the law. 
Within this first, “improper purpose,” line of cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has struck down laws under rational basis review when it 
perceived the law to be a disguised attempt to harm a politically 
unpopular or powerless group.123  This was the situation in USDA v. 
Moreno, in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down amendments to 
food stamp eligibility because they appeared to target “hippies” instead 
of targeting those who were specifically likely to abuse the program.124  
Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down a law requiring a special permit for a 
mentally disabled home because the law seemed “to rest on an irrational 
prejudice against the mentally retarded.”125  Finally, in Romer v. Evans, 
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Colorado law that prohibited local 
governments from enacting anti-discrimination ordinances that protected 
homosexuals.126 
In these cases, the Court seemed to apply a heightened level of 
scrutiny (while still under rational basis review) that was minimally 
deferential to the legislative branch and found that the challenged law 
                                                          
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Peden, 930 P.2d at 11 (“Under the [rational] basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the 
specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any, in establishing the challenged 
classification.  Rather, if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify the alleged 
statutory discrimination, the statute will not be set aside as a violation of equal protection.” (quoting 
Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1184 (Kan. 1991)). 
 123.  Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 
WASH. L. REV. 281, 298–99 (2011). 
 124.  413 U.S. 528, 537−38 (1973). 
 125.  473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
 126.  517 U.S. 620, 635−36 (1996). 
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was really an attempt to penalize an unpopular group.127  The U.S. 
Supreme Court explained this more demanding version of rational basis 
review in Moreno: 
For if the constitutional conception of “equal protection of the laws” 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.128 
The Kansas Supreme Court has also indicated support for this “improper 
purpose” type of analysis: 
Under the rational basis test, great deference is given to the legislature 
in establishing classifications.  However, where, as here, the only basis 
for the classification is to deny a benefit to one group for no purpose 
other than to discriminate against that group, the statutory classification 
is . . . without a rational basis . . . .129 
This federal and state precedent establishes that a law is vulnerable under 
equal protection when its purpose is to harm or disadvantage a particular 
group.  This “improper purpose” precedent, combined with the Kansas 
precedent that applies equal protection review to unfair benefits, suggests 
that states can violate equal protection by unfairly benefitting a 
particularly powerful group. 
While not typically included in this “improper purpose” line of 
federal precedent, Zobel v. Williams is also pertinent to this analysis 
because it involves purely economic discrimination and not larger issues 
of social exclusion.130  Zobel was an equal protection challenge to an 
Alaskan statute that distributed funds from state-owned oil resources to 
citizens based on how long they had resided in Alaska.131  Under this 
statute, a resident who had lived in Alaska for one year received a $50 
payment each year while someone who had lived in Alaska since it 
became a state in 1959 received a $1,050 payment.132 
The Alaskan Supreme Court upheld the law because it advanced the 
purpose of acknowledging “contributions of various kinds, both tangible 
and intangible, which residents have made during their years of 
                                                          
 127.  Farrell, supra note 123, at 298. 
 128.  Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. 
 129.  Thompson v. KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773, 782. (Kan. 1993). 
 130.  457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
 131.  Id. at 57. 
 132.  Id. 
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residency.”133  The U.S. Supreme Court analyzed this statute under 
rational basis review and concluded that acknowledgment of past civic 
contributions was not a “legitimate state purpose.”134  In doing so, the 
Court noted that allowing a state to give payments for past 
accomplishments would allow a state to be divided up into different 
classes of residents.135 
According to this “improper purpose” line of cases, HB 2117 is 
constitutionally vulnerable even under rational basis review.  The law 
can be seen as either unfairly burdening those who will continue to pay 
state income taxes (many of whom are less economically powerful than 
entity owners) or unfairly benefitting an entire class of entity owners and 
certain types of passive investors. 
The supporters of HB 2117 suggest that the law’s disparate treatment 
of certain groups would improve the Kansas economy and increase 
Kansans’ disposable income.136  But HB 2117 furthers these purposes by 
specifically favoring one type of compensation arrangement over 
another, without regard to the substantive services provided by each 
group.137  Unlike other government subsidies or tax breaks, HB 2117 
discriminates solely based on form with no consideration of the larger 
effects that business will have on society.  This is contrary to federal law, 
which generally taxes personal service income at the same rate, 
regardless of whether the income is earned as an employee, independent 
contractor, or partner.138 
The Kansas Supreme Court has previously acknowledged an equal 
protection prohibition against distinctions based on mere ownership in 
the context of property tax exemptions.  In In re Central Illinois Public 
Services Co., the court reasoned that property tax exemptions based on 
who owns a particular piece of property would violate equal protection 
because classification based on ownership “discriminates against one 
citizen in favor of another.”139  This seems to prohibit tax distinctions 
based on status, as opposed to substantive or real-world function.  As a 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 61, 63 (quoting Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 458 (Alaska 1980)). 
 134.  Id. at 63. 
 135.  Id. at 64. 
 136.  Press Release, supra note 15. 
 137.  Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 336 (“Much of the disparity in treatment among taxpayers 
arises from the fact that [HB 2117] isolates tax benefits based on source and entity, rather than the 
nature of the underlying income.”). 
 138.  Id. at 33536. 
 139.  78 P.3d 419, 427 (Kan. 2003) (quoting State ex rel. Stephan v. Parrish, 891 P.2d 445, 452 
(Kan. 1995)). 
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result, this standard of equal protection would seem to prohibit HB 2117 
because it discriminates entirely based on who the person filing the tax 
form is, rather than what the person filing the form does.  The idea that 
the U.S. Constitution prohibits this type of raw favoritism has been 
recognized as an important principle in many areas of constitutional 
law.140  One prominent scholar, Cass Sunstein, has described this broad 
principle: 
Although [several constitutional] clauses have different historical roots 
and were originally directed at different problems, they are united by a 
common theme and focused on a single underlying evil: the distribution 
of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another solely on 
the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to 
obtain what they want.141 
Accordingly, equal protection rational basis review can be seen as a 
weak version of this constitutional prohibition against “naked 
preference.”142 
There are several possible counterarguments to this equal protection 
argument.  One could argue that Kansas wage-earners do not constitute a 
similar class to hippies, the mentally disabled, or homosexuals.  These 
classes are based on characteristics that are socially distinct and arguably 
define who someone is rather than what she chooses to do.  Choice of 
business entity could be seen as a less socially important trait.  This 
argument would contend that any unfavored employee could choose to 
start a favored business entity and receive the tax benefits from HB 2117.  
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized an individual right to 
carry out one’s chosen profession,143 and several professions simply 
cannot be performed as an independent contractor or sole proprietor.  It 
is impossible to be a sole proprietor police officer, judge, prosecutor, or 
teacher.  In this sense, HB 2117 can be seen as specifically 
discriminating against professions that require employee status. 
                                                          
 140.  Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689 
(1984). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 1713. 
 143.  See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 
221−22 (1984) (determining that workers’ right to seek employment with city contractors was 
“sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation” to fall within the protections of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 720 (1973) (“It requires no argument to show that 
the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of 
the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the (Fourteenth) Amendment to 
secure.” (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)) (alteration in original)).  
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Another possible counterargument is that the groups previously 
protected in the “improper purpose” category were all small minorities, 
while employees constitute a large population within Kansas.  This 
argument can be dismissed because these cases can all be read as 
disadvantaging democratically unpopular groups.  While the previous 
groups were not democratically powerful because of relatively small 
numbers, Kansas employees can be seen as not democratically powerful 
because of their relatively small economic influence.  While many not-
wealthy and relatively powerless independent contractors and small 
business owners will benefit from HB 2117, as discussed above, the 
legislation will provide the largest benefits to the most-wealthy Kansans.  
If a court were to refuse to consider those who will continue to pay state 
income taxes as a sufficient class to invoke the “improper purpose” 
precedent, it would allow a small number of politically powerful 
individuals to favor themselves without even purporting to benefit the 
greater good. 
Another possible counterargument is that the difference in tax 
treatment of capital gains and employment income under federal law is 
an example where similar discrimination already occurs.144  There are 
two reasons why this argument fails.  First, this disparate treatment is 
based on substantive, real-world differences in how the income was 
earned and the federal government generally tries to keep the 
classifications consistent.145  Generally, passive income is taxed at a 
lower rate than active income earned from labor.146  Here, HB 2117 
discriminates on exactly the opposite principle.  It taxes income 
differently not based on any substantive difference, but based on the 
form in which the income is received.  Second, there is difference in 
treatment between earned income and capital gains but only to an extent 
under federal tax law.  Under HB 2117, there is an infinite tax disparity 
between employees and those who receive the newly exempt sources of 
income.  Favoring those who receive certain types of income without 
regard to underlying, substantive differences is an improper purpose 
under equal protection. 
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 145.  Id. at 336. 
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C. HB 2117 Under Federal Tax Precedent 
A state or federal court could also rely on another line of federal 
cases in overturning HB 2117 as a violation of equal protection.  In 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission, a business 
challenged a local property tax assessment on equal protection 
grounds.147  The county assessor had valued property on the basis of its 
most recent purchase price and made only small adjustments to the 
assessments of land that had not been recently sold.148  Over time, this 
system created large disparities between recent and longtime 
landowners.149  The plaintiff, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company, was 
taxed at approximately thirty-five times the rate of similar landowners.150 
The U.S. Supreme Court found this local tax assessment system 
unconstitutional in light of the West Virginia Constitution, which 
required that property must be taxed at a uniform rate.151  The Court 
reasoned that the constitutional infringement came not from the overall 
rate of taxation, but from the relative inequality in taxation.152  Another 
factor in the Court’s decision was that the assessment practice at issue 
was a unilateral application of West Virginia law by the local county tax 
assessor, which was contrary to the general expectation of equal 
taxation.153 
However, since Allegheny, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to 
overturn tax classifications on equal protection grounds.  In Nordlinger v. 
Hahn, the Court upheld a California constitutional amendment that 
greatly favored longtime owners over newer owners because the statute 
at issue promoted neighborhood stability and protected longtime owners’ 
reliance interests in certain tax rates.154  The Supreme Court also upheld 
a state tax scheme that taxed riverboat slot machines at 20% while taxing 
racetrack slot machines at 36% in Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central 
Iowa.155  The Supreme Court concluded that the promotion of riverboat 
                                                          
 147.  488 U.S. 336, 339 (1989). 
 148.  Id. at 338. 
 149.  Id. at 341. 
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 151.  Id. at 345 (“[West Virginia’s] Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind 
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 152.  Id. at 346. 
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 154.  505 U.S. 1, 7,12, 18 (1992). 
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Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2004). 
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and related businesses, as well as protection of their reliance interests, 
was a legitimate basis for the unequal tax treatment.156  The Court 
summarized its equal protection analysis by concluding “the facts do not 
preclud[e] an inference that the reason for the different tax rates was to 
help the riverboat industry or the river communities.”157 
HB 2117 can be seen as unconstitutional on equal protection grounds 
under Allegheny, Nordlinger, and Fitzgerald.  If a court were to interpret 
the holding of Allegheny as dependent on the West Virginia 
Constitution’s presumption of tax equality, HB 2117 could be 
unconstitutional under equal protection because of the presumption of 
equality in Kansas income taxation outlined in Part III of this Comment.  
Because HB 2117 deviates from this constitutional presumption, its 
discriminatory structure could be particularly suspect under equal 
protection review. 
There are also several important differences between HB 2117 and 
the taxation schemes in Nordlinger and Fitzgerald. As for Nordlinger, 
HB 2117 introduces new benefits, and consequently, does not harm 
business owners’ reliance interests on previous tax rates (and obviously 
does not impact neighbored stability).  As for Fitzgerald, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the Iowa statute in Fitzgerald by identifying 
specific plausible benefits of the law.  The Court concluded that the Iowa 
statute benefited a specific industry and a specific location.158  HB 2117 
does not benefit one location, industry, or activity in particular.  It 
benefits those who choose to use certain business forms.  This 
encourages a legal classification, but does not rationally further any 
specific interest.  Owners of Christian book stores and adult book stores 
alike may benefit equally under HB 2117.  Liquor store owners and 
alcohol rehabilitation center owners may also benefit equally from the 
law.  Also, the discriminatory tax treatment in Fitzgerald was a matter of 
degree.  The racetrack slot machines were taxed at 36% while riverboat 
slot machines were taxed at 20%.159  Under HB 2117, Kansas employees 
will be taxed at a rate approaching 4.9% while owners of the favored 
entities will not be taxed at all.160  This is obviously a larger relative 
difference between the favored and unflavored groups. 
                                                          
 156.  Id. at 108−09. 
 157.  Id. at 110 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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river communities or to promote riverboat history, say, by providing incentives for riverboats to 
remain in the State, rather than relocate to other States.”). 
 159.  Id. at 105. 
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D. HB 2117 and Kansas Tax Precedent 
The Kansas Supreme Court has also applied an equal protection-type 
analysis in the context of income tax disparities.  The court has 
interpreted article 11, section 2 to require that “where a classification is 
made, that classification must be natural and not arbitrary or capricious, 
and all persons in the same class must be treated in the same way.”161  
The court stated these requirements in Hartman v. State Commission of 
Revenue & Taxation when it overturned a statute based on the unequal 
income tax treatment of two similar sources of income.162  The Kansas 
statute at issue (section 79-3216(a)) required “100 percent of the gain 
[]be taken into account in computing net income” when a taxpayer 
received assets from a business liquidation.163  This imposed a much 
greater tax burden on taxpayers who received assets from a liquidated 
business compared to those who sold stock in a still-operating 
business.164  Those who sold stock in a still-operating business were only 
taxed on their net income from the sale.165  The Court found the 
distinction between these two types of sales unreasonable and concluded 
that 
[B]oth classes were treated alike until the assertion of the percentage 
rate was applied, when a discrimination was made.  In our opinion the 
result was not one having a reasonable relation to the subject of the 
right and privilege taxed, the classification made was not natural, and 
the members in the same class were not treated alike . . . . 166 
This suggests not only a prohibition against “arbitrary” classifications, 
but a preference for classifications that have “a reasonable relation to the 
subject of the right and privilege taxed.”167 
The Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed these implicit requirements of 
article 11, section 2 in Barker v. State when it upheld a statutory scheme 
that subjected federal military retirees to state income taxes while 
exempting state retirees.168  The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that 
                                                          
 161.  Hartman v. State Comm’n of Revenue & Taxation, 187 P.2d 939, 944 (Kan. 1947). 
 162.  Id. at 946. 
 163.  Id. at 941 (emphasis omitted). 
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the state had a “rational reason” for the disparate treatment.169  The 
court’s analysis indicated that the prohibition against “arbitrary” 
distinctions requires that a discriminatory tax “bear a reasonable 
relationship to the subject taxed.”170  Both Hartman and Barker make 
clear that Kansas income tax distinctions must related to the “subject” 
taxed. 
The tax distinctions within HB 2117 fail this minimal standard.  As 
previously explained, HB 2117 discriminates solely based on the source 
of the income.  For example, an attorney working for a corporation is 
taxed under HB 2117, while an attorney working as a sole proprietor is 
not.171  If the “subject” of the Kansas income tax in both instances is 
professional services, what is the distinction between the corporate 
attorney and the independent attorney that is “rationally related” to 
providing these services?  In Barker, the court reasoned that the state 
retirees deserved favorable tax treatment because it benefitted the state’s 
interest in recruiting quality employees.172  In Hartman, the court 
concluded there was no legitimate distinction between the two types of 
asset sales.173  These holdings suggest that legal distinctions must be 
supported by substantive, nonlegal differences between the types of 
income.  HB 2117 discriminates based on legal categories and not based 
on substantive distinctions, which renders it constitutionally vulnerable 
under the implicit requirements of article 11, section 2 of the Kansas 
Constitution. 
V. “ARBITRARY” CLASSIFICATIONS WITHIN HB 2117 AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION 
HB 2117 is also constitutionally vulnerable because of the specific 
tax mechanisms it uses to distinguish between types of income.  One 
theme that runs through the article 11, section 2 cases in the previous 
section is the prohibition against “arbitrary or capricious” 
classifications.174  While the equal protection portion of this Comment 
addresses inequality between similar taxpayers, this Part examines the 
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statutory mechanisms HB 2117 relies on to create that unequal treatment.  
HB 2117 creates substantive Kansas tax distinctions based on which 
federal form certain types of income are reported.175  This reliance on 
IRS forms establishes arbitrary distinctions within Kansas income tax 
law and is therefore likely unconstitutional.  Similarly, because HB 2117 
arbitrarily relies on IRS forms, it is constitutionally vulnerable as an 
impermissible delegation of Kansas legislative authority to a federal 
administrative agency.  While the Kansas constitution explicitly allows 
for delegation by reference to federal tax “laws,”176 it does not allow 
delegation by reference to federal tax forms or instructions. 
A. IRS Forms Determine Substantive Kansas Tax Law Under HB 2117 
HB 2117 exempts sources and types of income based on which line 
the income is reported to the IRS.  Specifically, HB 2117 exempts certain 
types of income by changing the way Kansas AGI is calculated for 
individuals under section 79-32,117 of the Kansas Statutes.177  After HB 
2117, the statute defining AGI for Kansas purposes now reads: 
(c) There shall be subtracted from federal adjusted gross income: 
. . . . 
(xx) For all taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012, the 
amount of any: (1) Net profit from business as determined under the 
federal internal revenue code and reported from schedule C and on line 
12 of the taxpayer’s form 1040 federal individual income tax return; (2) 
net income from rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S 
corporations, estates, trusts . . . as determined under the federal internal 
revenue code and reported from schedule E and on line 17 of the 
taxpayer’s form 1040 federal individual income tax return; and (3) net 
farm profit as determined under the federal internal revenue code and 
reported from schedule F and on line 18 of the taxpayer’s form 1040 
federal income tax return; all to the extent included in the taxpayer’s 
federal adjusted gross income. For purposes of this subsection, 
references to the federal form 1040 and federal schedule C, schedule E, 
and schedule F, shall be to such form and schedules as they existed for 
                                                          
 175.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,117(c)(xx) (Supp. 2012). 
 176.  KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 11. 
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tax year 2011 and as revised thereafter by the internal revenue 
service.178 
The Kansas Department of Revenue has indicated that these references to 
the federal tax forms are not merely for reference, but instead, 
“determinative” as to whether an individual can exempt income.179 
The Kansas Department of Revenue has provided three sets of 
requirements to qualify for each of the new exemptions in section 79-
32,117(c)(xx).180  These lists of requirements are written with explicit 
reference to the income being “properly reported” on certain lines of 
federal tax forms.181  For instance, to qualify for the net business profit 
exemption listed in paragraph (xx)(1), the Department of Revenue says 
the income must be “properly reported on Schedule C of federal Form 
1040” and then included on “Line 12 of federal Form 1040.”182  The 
Department states, “Income not properly reported in accordance with 
federal income tax law and instructions . . . is outside the scope of . . . 
(c)(xx).”183  It is clear that compliance with federal tax forms is 
controlling for purposes of Kansas income tax law. 
B. HB 2117 Unconstitutionally Relies on Arbitrary Federal Tax Forms 
Several factors indicate that tying substantive Kansas tax law to 
individual lines on IRS forms is an “arbitrary” or “capricious” method of 
creating tax distinctions.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “arbitrary” as 
“[d]epending on individual discretion . . . determined by a judge rather 
than by fixed rules, procedures, or law.”184  Similarly, it defines 
“capricious” as “characterized by or guided by unpredictable or 
impulsive behavior.”185 
Two factors indicate that HB 2117 imposes arbitrary distinctions by 
relying on IRS forms and instructions.  First, the language in 26 U.S.C. 
                                                          
 178.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,117(c)(xx). 
 179.  See, e.g., Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 302 (“The Department of Revenue takes the 
position that only income ‘properly reported’ on Schedule C qualifies for the paragraph (xx) 
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§ 6011(a) indicates that IRS forms are dictated by discretionary federal 
administrative decisions.  This section mandates that that every person 
required to file a tax return shall make one “according to the forms and 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary.”186  Second, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated that the major purpose of federal tax forms is to give the 
IRS sufficient tax information “with such uniformity, completeness, and 
arrangement” that processing the forms “may be readily 
accomplished.”187  Similarly, the U.S. Tax Court has previously stated 
that a filer’s tax return could be sufficient (for statute of limitations 
purposes) despite not being completed on the correct forms.188  HB 2117 
relies on federal tax forms not to streamline federal administrative 
convenience as contemplated by these courts, but instead to determine 
the content of Kansas tax law.  Because HB 2117 uses the federal tax 
forms for a different purpose than the one contemplated by the federal 
government, it is more likely that taxpayers will be treated unfairly or 
arbitrarily. 
The treatment of capital gains income from partnerships, S 
corporations, and LLCs is one specific example of how a particular 
federal tax form peculiarity will arbitrarily decide Kansas tax law.  
According to the post-HB 2117 version of section 79-32,117(xx)(2), 
income from partnerships, S corporations, and LLCs is exempt if it is 
properly reported “from schedule E and on line 17 of the taxpayer’s form 
1040 federal individual income tax return.”189  The Department of 
Revenue has indicated that the instructions for Schedule K-1 (which is 
given to those receiving income from partnerships, S corporations., and 
LLCs) are determinative as to whether income is properly reported from 
Schedule E on line 17 of individual’s Form 1040.190  Because the 
instructions accompanying Schedule K-1 say to report partnership, S 
corporation, and LLC capital gains income on Schedule D and not 
Schedule E, the Kansas Department of Revenue concludes that this type 
of income would not be properly reported on Line 17 of Form 1040 as 
the statute requires.191  Kansans will continue to pay income tax on 
capital gains from these entities for this reason. 
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This is an entirely arbitrary reliance on the federal form system.  The 
most likely reason that capital gains from partnerships, S corporations, 
and LLCs are reported on Schedule D (and not Schedule E) before being 
reported on Form 1040 is that the federal government taxes long-term 
capital gains at a lower rate than other types of income.192  Schedule D is 
used to calculate how much of an individual’s income is long-term 
versus short-term capital gains because of this deferential tax 
treatment.193  In effect, HB 2117 relies on federal tax forms to 
accomplish the exact opposite of what the IRS intended when it created 
this form structure.  Partnership capital gains is not exempt from Kansas 
income taxation while ordinary partnership income will be reported on 
Schedule E, and it is therefore exempt from Kansas income taxation.  
This is ironic because HB 2117 relies on a federal form system which 
favors capital gains in order to create a system which disfavors capital 
gains.  If, for example, Congress decides to tax long-term capital gains at 
the same rate as other types of income, capital gains from partnerships, S 
corporations, and LLCs would presumably not require Schedule D and 
would likely be reported on Schedule E (and thus on Line 17 of Form 
1040) with the rest of partnership income.  This would mean that capital 
gains from partnerships, S corporations, and LLCs would no longer be 
subject to Kansas income taxes because the federal government decided 
to raise taxes on capital gains. 
Similarly, HB 2117 does not exempt gains from casualty or theft of 
business property or gains from sales, exchanges, and involuntary 
conversions of trade or business property because of federal technical 
considerations.194  The federal instructions for Schedule E specify that 
casualty or theft gains and losses must be reported on Form 4648.195  
Consequently, these gains are not exempt from Kansas income taxation.  
HB 2117 also does not exempt income from sales, exchanges, and 
involuntary conversion of trade or business property because this type of 
income is reported on Form 4797 and therefore does not end up on 
                                                          
 192.  While neither the Schedule D itself nor the accompanying instructions explicitly state that 
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Schedule E and line 17 of the taxpayer’s 1040.196  This is inconsistent 
with both the overall federal income tax scheme and the stated purpose 
of HB 2117.  Under the federal system, generally, trade or business 
property held for more than one year is taxed at the capital gains rate.  
This system encourages investment in trade or business property because 
any profit from the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of that 
property is taxed at a lower rate than ordinary earned income.  Under HB 
2117, Kansas will tax this type of gain at a higher rate than distributed 
profits.  For example, if a Kansas LLC decides to distribute $10,000 of 
profits, the owners of the LLC will not be taxed by the state on that 
income.  However, if that LLC decides buy a $10,000 machine instead, 
and then sells that machine for a profit, Kansas will tax this income.  
Again, this is the opposite of what is contemplated by the federal tax 
system.  HB 2117 uses a federal system that incentivizes investment to 
discourage investment in Kansas. 
The HB 2117 scheme causes arbitrary treatment of Kansas 
taxpayers.  While Kansas previously tied its income tax system to federal 
laws and definitions,197 these references more or less adopted the entirety 
of a federal tax system with Kansas-specific modifications.  HB 2117 
changes this by relying on individual federal provisions in ways not 
contemplated by the federal government.  This creates the risk of 
inadvertent changes in Kansas tax law because of changes in the federal 
form structure.  Consequently, this reliance on federal tax forms is an 
arbitrary basis for the differences in tax outcomes under HB 2117 and a 
violation of the implicit requirements of article 11, section 2 of the 
Kansas constitution. 
C.  HB 2117 Unconstitutionally Delegates Kansas Legislative Authority 
to the IRS 
Related to HB 2117’s reliance on “arbitrary” distinctions to tax 
similar taxpayers differently, is HB 2117’s unconstitutional delegation of 
Kansas legislative authority to an administrative agency of the federal 
government. 
Kansas precedent indicates that there are limited situations where the 
delegation of Kansas legislative power is appropriate.198  If the Kansas 
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constitution does not allow for delegation of a particular power, then that 
delegation is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine embodied 
in article 11, section 1, “which vests legislative power with the 
legislature only.”199  The Kansas Supreme Court has defined legislative 
power as the “power to make a law, as opposed to the power to enforce a 
law,” which is left to the administrative branch.200  The court has defined 
the difference between legislative and administrative power as a matter 
of specificity.201  If a statute contains “sufficient policies and standards to 
guide the nonlegislative body,” then it is delegating administrative, rather 
than legislative, power.202 
In the case of income tax delegation, the Kansas constitution 
specifically gives the legislature the ability to tie Kansas income tax law 
to federal law.  Adopted in 1966, article 11, section 11 of the constitution 
reads: 
In enacting any [income tax] law under section 2 of this article 11, the 
legislature may . . . define income by reference to or otherwise adopt by 
reference all or any part of the laws of the United States as they then 
exist, and, prospectively, as they may thereafter be amended or enacted, 
with such exceptions, additions or modifications as the legislature may 
determine . . . .203 
Specifically, section 79-32,109 of the Kansas Statutes adopts federal 
definitions by stating that “[a]ny term used in this act shall have the same 
meaning as when used in a comparable context” in the federal internal 
revenue code (IRC).204  During the 2013 session, the Kansas Legislature 
clarified that all references to federal forms, schedules or line numbers 
within the Kansas income tax act refer to such “form, schedule and line 
number as they existed for tax year 2011 and as revised thereafter by the 
internal revenue service.”205  While it is clear the legislature is allowed to 
adopt federal tax definitions within federal “laws,” nothing suggests the 
legislature can delegate Kansas legislative authority based on federal tax 
forms and instructions. 
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There are important differences between federal tax laws and federal 
tax forms and instructions.  The federal definition of adjusted gross 
income—on which current Kansas income tax law relies—is contained 
within a federal statute,206 meaning Congress engaged in a public process 
and passed a law to define adjusted gross income.  Conversely, federal 
forms—on which HB 2117 relies—were created by internal processes 
within the U.S. Department of the Treasury and were “proscribed by the 
secretary.”.207  As mentioned in the analysis above, an alteration in the 
federal form structure would change the content of Kansas tax law. 
It appears that HB 2117’s amendments to section 79-32,117 are the 
only instances in the entire Kansas income tax act which reference 
federal forms to create substantive Kansas tax distinctions.  Section 79-
3221 also references federal tax forms, but merely requires that Kansas 
tax returns “be made as nearly as practical in the same form as the 
corresponding form of the income tax return by the United States.”208  
Similarly, section 79-3222 requires that each individual or entity doing 
business in the state file a copy of her or its federal return with the 
Kansas director of taxation at or before the IRS deadline.209  However, all 
these references to federal forms are for the administrative convenience 
of the state and do not create substantive tax distinctions.  In fact, there 
appear to be only four explicit references to federal regulations of any 
type (as opposed to federal statutes) within the Kansas income tax act.210  
This novelty of relying on federal forms (or federal regulations of any 
kind) to create substantive tax distinctions within the Kansas income tax 
act suggests that there has previously been an assumption that the 
legislature could only adopt federal statutes as “laws” under article 11, 
section 11 of the Kansas Constitution.  Because HB 2117 adopts federal 
                                                          
 206.  I.R.C. § 62 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 207.  Id. § 6011(a) (2006). 
 208.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3221(a). 
 209.  Id. § 79-3222. 
 210.  See id. § 79-32,175(a) (defining “Accessible to individuals with a disability” according to 
the federal statutory definition within 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and “28 CFR Part 36 and 29 CFR 1630 et 
seq.”); id. § 79-32,211(a) (providing a tax credit for certain historic structure rehabilitation 
expenditures and adopting the federal definition of “placed in service” within I.R.C. § 47(b)(1) and 
26 C.F.R. § 1.48-12(f)(2) for calculation of the Kansas credit); id. § 79-32,222 (providing a tax 
credit for oil refinery expenditures “to comply with environmental standards . . . pursuant to federal 
statute or regulation”); id. § 79-324c(f) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow 
disclosure . . . where such disclosure is prohibited by the federal internal revenue code . . . related 
federal internal revenue rules or regulations.”).  However, none of these references to federal 
regulations are similar to the use of IRS forms in section 79-32,117.  The first two of these 
references adopt static federal regulatory definitions and the latter two references require compliance 
with overall federal “regulation” in a generic sense.  Conversely, HB 2117 adopts individual lines on 
federal forms (as opposed to regulations) as determinative. 
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tax forms and instructions, which are not statutory laws, it may constitute 
an unconstitutional delegation of Kansas legislative authority. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. McDonald presented a similar tax 
delegation issue.211  In Missouri Pacific, a railroad challenged a Kansas 
statute that adopted the Interstate Commerce Commission’s method of 
accounting, which produced an unfavorable result for the railroad 
compared to other businesses.212  The Kansas Supreme Court upheld this 
delegation and, notably, analyzed the issue without reference to article 
11, section 11 of the Constitution, which was not yet enacted during the 
tax period at issue.213  There are three crucial differences between the use 
of the accounting system used in Missouri Pacific and HB 2117’s use of 
individual federal tax forms and instructions. 
First, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the delegation in Missouri 
Pacific because the statute “provides for sufficient basic standards and 
reasonably definite policy for its administration.”214  In effect, the Kansas 
Legislature was implementing a consistent, logical policy through its 
reliance on the federal accounting system.  Conversely, HB 2117 adopts 
federal forms and implements accidental policy outcomes, at least in 
isolated instances.215 
Second, the statute in Missouri Pacific adopted an entire federal 
system of railroad accounting.  Although the plaintiff argued this system 
was primarily created for rate-making purposes, the court concluded that 
“rate-making is an integral part of the process wherein net income is 
ultimately derived.”216  Here, HB 2117 adopts individual lines of federal 
tax forms as determinative regardless of how those lines fit with federal 
income tax law or Kansas income tax law.  In fact, as in the case of HB 
2117’s treatment of capital gains, HB 2117 adopts federal forms in a 
manner specifically inconsistent with the federal government’s use of 
those forms.  This fact withdraws the tax distinctions within HB 2117 
from coherence within the federal system. 
Third, the court in Missouri Pacific noted that any Kansas tax 
determinations based on the federal commission’s standards were 
“surrounded with safeguards.”217  As the Kansas Department of Revenue 
                                                          
 211.  486 P.2d 1347 (Kan. 1971). 
 212.  Id. at 1348–51. 
 213.  Id. at 1348, 1353. 
 214.  Id. at 1352. 
 215.  See supra notes 189−93 and accompanying text. 
 216.  Mo. Pac., 486 P.2d at 1352. 
 217.  Id. at 1353. 
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has decided, decisions under HB 2117 will be determined exclusively by 
whether the income is “properly reported” on the federal forms.218  This 
means there are no Kansas specific safeguards in place to make sure that 
Kansas taxpayers are treated fairly or in a manner consistent with the 
Kansas legislature’s chosen policy.  Because HB 2117 creates 
substantive tax distinctions based on federal forms proscribed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and not federal “laws” passed by Congress, it 
is an impermissible delegation of the Kansas Legislature’s legislative 
authority. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
HB 2117 is a revolutionary piece of legislation that dramatically 
changed Kansas income taxation.  Largely because of the bill’s 
unprecedented nature, HB 2117 is vulnerable on several constitutional 
fronts.  HB 2117 enacts a regressive income tax scheme that may be 
impermissible under article 11, section 2 of the Kansas Constitution in 
light of the text and history of that provision.  HB 2117 treats similar 
taxpayers differently and consequently may violate the state and federal 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection.  Finally, HB 2117 creates 
arbitrary tax distinctions based on federal forms that are entirely devoid 
of substantive justifications.  This potentially renders the statute an 
unconstitutional delegation of the Kansas Legislature’s authority. 
 
                                                          
 218.  See, e.g., Dickinson et al., supra note 3, at 302. 
